When Soft Power Turns Hard: 
Is an EU Strategic Culture Possible?

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Posing the question of whether the European Union is likely to develop a strategic culture, this article discusses the concept of human security as the possible basis for a novel type of such a culture. It argues that there are incentives for governments to 'pool' sovereignty in the security and defence field on the logic of two-level games, while noting that EU institutions themselves are developing both political and military capacities at present. The sensitive issue of developing a strategic culture for coercive diplomacy and the consequent use of force is not progressing. However, the ideological basis for a post-national strategic culture based on human security provides a window of opportunity for the EU.

Keywords Strategic culture • human security • EU security policy • post-national foreign policy

Transactions are nowadays delayed by hindrances of which previously we were free. Yesterday it was only a question of material interests, of an increase in territory or commerce; now one deals with moral interests . . . in dispatches.

Chateaubriand (quoted in Neumann, 2003: 133)

The absence of a warrior ethic in modern democracies means that the use of force requires an elaborate moral justification to ensure popular support.

Joseph Nye, Jr (2004: 119)

IN A PROVOCATIVE ARTICLE in a previous issue of Security Dialogue, Ulrich Beck argues that the new ‘religion of human rights’ leads to the emergence of a ‘new kind of post-national politics of military humanism’ (Beck, 2005: 9). This is deeply troubling for liberal democracies, Beck argues; the good and the bad become confused, and the use of military power is legitimised through ethical arguments. In contrast to this view, British Prime
Minister Tony Blair (1999) argues that the military tool can and should be a ‘force for good’. The same phrase is found in the EU’s Security Strategy (European Union, 2003). But, Blair’s greatest liability in his election to a third term of office was precisely the military tool and its application in Iraq.

Using military force does not go down well with democratic publics when the issue is not one of existential survival – unless an imminent humanitarian crisis or genocide is unfolding, accompanied by heavy media coverage. The use of military force is also risky in a new way: a campaign for re-election may be jeopardized and even lost. The use of military force should be timed to fit the electoral cycle, remarks Adrian Hyde-Price (2004: 241), half in jest.

The use of military force is perhaps ultimately impossible in democracies that lack both the foreign policy prerogative and a ‘warrior ethic’, and where publics change their mind about such use according to the latest media reports. Or, might it be that a new strategic culture is emerging, one in which the use of military force must be calibrated to European publics and the demands of their media for what I will term the ‘soft power use of hard power’?

Outline of Argument

This article asks whether the EU is likely to become a strategic actor and, if so, what kind of strategic actor – exploring the concept of ‘human security’ as the basis for a new type of strategic culture and the logic of two-level games as the dynamic of state action.

I argue that the key to understanding the EU’s potential and possible role as a strategic actor lies in the new use of military force, as well as in its justification – aptly summed up in Tony Blair’s reference to a ‘force for good’. I do not expect that the EU will imitate US strategic culture or tradition. On the contrary, the question with regard to the EU is whether the ‘soft model of hard power’ is a contradiction in terms: Is a strategic culture at all possible within the constraints of a liberal, democratic politics that ‘speaks softly and carries a big carrot’?

The EU has been eminently successful in structuring the new democracies of the East through political conditionality, with either membership or close trade and cooperation agreements as the incentive. This is different, however, from threatening the use of force. In the field of actually deploying force, the EU has shown ability, but the only operation involving armed troops so far has been Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo in June 2003, which was initiated and led by France. France also bore the brunt of the military risk. In other deployments, it is rather police tasks and post-conflict stability that are at issue. EUFOR in Bosnia and earlier
missions under more limited mandates are all ‘very post-conflict’, taken over from NATO after the heat of battle (Hansen, forthcoming).

There is thus no good indication of an EU strategic culture, however embryonic, to be discerned in recent EU history. The issue of using hard power – military force – has not been addressed much beyond the European Security Strategy (ESS, to be discussed further below), and the EU has a tradition and history of being an actor that is ‘civilian’ – that is, it employs soft-power tools such as diplomacy and the building of interdependence rather than confrontation (Delcourt, 2003; Manners, 2002). Nonetheless, the EU has built up considerable capacity in the military field over recent years, and this has been deployed in various missions.

In the following, I first discuss the concepts of strategic culture and strategic actor. Then, I briefly turn to the issue of capability (military and political) and its relationship to strategic actorness. Finally, I analyse the concept of human security as a possible basis for a post-national strategic culture in the EU. The argument is that there are incentives for governments to ‘pool’ sovereignty in the security and defence field on the logic of two-level games. EU institutions are also themselves developing both political and military capacity at present. Thus, it seems likely that the EU can develop a strategic culture. The sensitive issue of developing a strategic culture for coercive diplomacy and the concomitant use of force, however, is not progressing. But, the ideological basis for a post-national strategic culture based on human security provides a window of opportunity for this unique post-national actor.

1 The EU has developed capacities for both civilian and military crises and for the integration of both elements – inter alia under the Civilian Headline Goals 2008 adopted in 2004 – while military capacity has been institutionalized through both rapid reaction force battle groups, follow-on forces and institutional capacity such as the PSC (Political and Security Committee), the EUMC (EU Military Committee) and the EUMS (EU Military Staff). It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the details of the various EU capacities, but useful analyses include Cameron & Quille (2004); Hanggi & Tanner (2005); Hansen (forthcoming).

2 These include the EUPM (European Union Police Mission) in Bosnia, to be continued for another two years, comprising 500 police staff; Operation Concordia in Macedonia, involving 400 military personnel, using NATO assets and Berlin Plus arrangements; Operation Artemis in the Democratic Republic of Congo, June–September 2003, involving 1,300 military personnel; EUPOL Proxima, a follow-on mission for Concordia, with 200 police officers, from 2003 to the present time; EUFOR ALTHEA in Bosnia, with a military force of 7,000 that replaced SFOR from 2004 to the present and makes use of NATO assets under the Berlin Plus agreement; EUPOL Kinshasa in the Democratic Republic of Congo, with 30 police staff, in 2005; EUJUST LEX in Iraq, comprising training courses held in EU member-states in relation to the rule of law, from 2005 to 2006; EUSEC in the Democratic Republic of Congo, a military mission to reform armed forces (Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, or DDR), from 2005 to 2006; EU Support AMIS II in Darfur, with both military and police support elements, from 2005 to the present; AMM (Aceh Monitoring Mission), with DDR tasks, involving 230 personnel, mainly officers, from 2005 to 2006; COPTPS (EUPOL Coordination Office for Palestinian Police Support) and the EU BAM RAFAH (EU Border Assistance Mission Rafah), both within the territory of the Palestinian Authority, involving 70 police and military personnel, from 2005 to 2006. For an in-depth discussion of Operation Artemis, see Ulriksen, Gourlay & Mace (2004).
A Post-National Strategic Culture in the Making?

As one analyst aptly summarized it, ‘Throughout the Cold War, force was needed to deter the other side from doing bad things outside its borders; today, force is needed to compel the other side to do good things inside its borders’ (Gwyn Prins, quoted in Hyde-Price, 2004: 338). The spectre of tasks known as ‘crisis management’ or Peace Support Operations (PSOs) has an ethical side that is of considerable political importance, as well as a more traditional *realpolitik* side that involves stark choices of national interest and the provision of effective deterrence against spillover and terrorist activity.

The internal conflict into which the PSO inserts itself has no proper place in the traditional legal norms of war: the rules for *ad bellum* as well as *in bello* do not easily apply. The inside–outside classification of the state and the concomitant basis this gives for international law is inadequate. We now ask unsettling questions such as: Is this a war, a military ‘campaign’, or something in-between? Is the military tool simply one ‘normal’ tool in the toolbox of democracy-building and stabilization?

Security policy in Europe is both *de-territorialized* and *de-nationalized*. Most use of European military power takes place far from national borders and does not involve territorial expansion, occupation or conquest. Although holding and controlling territory is part of the mission in a peace-enforcement operation – at least to some extent – territorial expansion or conquest is no longer the goal of or reason for the use of military force. Herbst (2004: 305) remarks that this development is entirely logical, since territory in our time is no longer the source of wealth and new income: ‘states are no longer compelled to expand their territorial reach to get rich . . . even states that can be easily conquered are no longer in danger because what they have is no longer worth fighting for’.

The PSO does not fit in with the laws on traditional interstate war. This factor further unravels the Weberian state and its inside–outside premise. When the use of force is de-territorialized in interventions that are undertaken for reasons that have nothing to do with traditional conquest, the traditional legitimacy basis for its use in defence of national territory disappears. The rules for interventions are modified to fit accordingly, with a clear weakening of the intervention norm taking place in the 1990s, from ‘humanitarian’ to ‘democratic’ intervention – mostly benign, but involving the risk of providing pretexts for a new Brezhnev doctrine (Matlary, 2006).

PSOs are limited in time and space, and they come about mainly for human security reasons, not for territorial security reasons. Regarding the latter, it is not the nation that is defended in these missions; on the contrary, it is ‘the strangers’, as Nicholas Wheeler (2000) aptly calls them. Thus, nationals intervene militarily in other states in order to save non-nationals. This makes
it easier for the EU to deploy military force and to develop a strategic culture, as the military ‘tool’ is more ‘normalized’ than before. A strategic culture for Europe must necessarily depend on notions of human security and human rights more than on traditional territorial defence of nationals. The EU is thus at the outset not ‘disadvantaged’, because it is not a state in this respect; in fact, it may rather have a unique ‘window of opportunity’, because it is an actor based on the rule of law, democracy and human rights, as spelled out both in its treaties and in the so-called Copenhagen Criteria for enlargement. The EU’s ‘ideology’ is one of human rights and democracy, and its security policy must rely on the same intellectual basis.

According to Hyde-Price (2004: 340–341), strategic thinking in Europe today must take the following norms into account: coercion and not brute force is necessary; force must be used legitimately – that is, in a multilateral manner and, best of all, with a UN mandate; furthermore, it must have a motivation that is seen as just; force protection and limited collateral damage are further norms for any actual deployment; finally, wars must be short and hopefully take place early on in an electoral cycle – the Iraq war, for example, proved to be the most significant drawback for Tony Blair’s election campaign for a third term of office.

Given these political parameters for the use of force in Europe, then, is the EU well poised to be a strategic actor and to develop a strategic culture?

**Government Interest in an EU Strategic Culture**

From the political point of view, the precariousness of using military force today makes it plausible that governments will always demand an international ‘umbrella’ for such use. It is a well-established fact that all PSOs today are multinational – either as UN, NATO or EU missions. Also, the military superpower, the USA, desires the ‘multilateralization’ of political risk through ‘coalitions of the willing’. This is done more for political than for military reasons, and the political aspects of burden-sharing today play a key role in NATO (Cimbala & Forster, 2005). This logic is one captured by the metaphor ‘two-level games’ (Putnam, 1988). A government wants to have multilateral cover for sensitive political actions such as the use of force; it wants to have the possibility of laying the blame for any potential failure on, for example, the EU, NATO or the UN; and it wants to be able to argue for continued use of military force in the face of domestic opposition. ‘The EU made me do it’ is indeed a commonly observed logic in national capitals when things go wrong, while national praise is equally normal when EU policies go well. I suggest that this fundamental logic is at work when European states consider whether to develop EU security policy further, for the follow-
ing reasons: First, publics are capricious in their support for ongoing military operations – opinion shifts with media reports, and there is thus considerable risk for individual governments, which cannot exit military commitments easily. Second, the EU is better able to integrate civilian and military tools than any other international organization, while PSOs demand such integration to an increasing extent, making the EU a useful arena for states.

There is no space for exploring the two-level hypothesis here. Suffice it to say that the hypothesis provides an explanation for why states may want stronger supranational elements also in the field of security policy in the future. The foreign policy prerogative obtains only in France and the UK today, and will probably weaken as democracy ‘invades’ even the security and defence field. In most EU states, parliaments and publics hold effective reins on the decision to deploy military force and may thus act as unpredictable constraints on government obligations in military missions (Wagner, 2005). Domestic constraints are important in all states but France and the UK. Furthermore, EU governments now use military force for general foreign policy aims related to gaining international influence (Matlary, 2005; Ulriksen, 1996), and view EU membership also in this perspective: ‘the main concern of foreign policy-makers was not the defence of national independence but the quest for influence’ (Aggestam, 2005: 16). This general motivation of seeking influence was also valid for British and French EU policy (Haugevik, 2005; Rieker, 2004). In this perspective, we may assume that also the militarily strong and self-sufficient states of the EU will develop increasing interest in a strong EU security and defence policy.

As of today, there is no supranational decisionmaking procedure for security policy in the EU, but the realist model of sovereignty-hedging does not seem to explain why this is the case. Rather, the reason is that the relevant EU policy has not yet been developed very far. In the context of the question of strategic culture, this is an important point, because it is commonly held that the security field is one where the pooling of sovereignty will not happen.

The Requirements for Strategic Action

What are the requirements of a strategic actor? First, there has to be a strategy; second, there has to be actor capacity. The latter has to be fairly unified in order to allow for strategic thinking and acting, which often involve both coercive diplomacy and a need for rapidity. The EU does not score highly on either variable: it is typically unable to act quickly in foreign policy and it has no tradition of coercive diplomacy.

The process of developing the security and defence dimension of EU for-
eign policy is characterized by ‘bottom-up’ incrementalism (Naumann & Ralston, 2005; Matlary, 2005). The battle group is an example of this: it is a capability in ‘search of a strategy’ (Gowan, 2005: 13). There is no evidence of top-down approaches apart from the European Defence Agency (EDA) (Khol, 2005; Biscop, 2005) and the European Security Strategy (Bailes, 2005). The former is mandated to plan and assist in a top-down fashion, but not to command states. The latter, discussed below, represents the strategic thinking that it is possible to achieve on the basis of intergovernmentalism and unanimity. The point here is that much capacity-building does take place within the EU in relation to security and defence policy, but there is a major gap between incrementalism in this area and the demands we must put on a strategic actor.

From the outset, then, it is clear that the concept of strategic actor as applied to the EU is awkward. There is a major debate about the concept of actorness itself in the EU literature – on whether the EU is an actor, a ‘presence’ or an arena (Bretherton & Vogler, 1999; Laffan, O’Donnell & Smith, 2000). In the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), especially with regard to deployment of military force, the decision rule is unanimity. Since the Constitutional Treaty remains in political limbo, the ‘permanent structured cooperation’ rule has not been adopted, but it was designed for procurement and military integration only (Van Camp, 2005) Thus, both the EDA and ‘permanent structured cooperation’ are methods of making the ‘bottom-up’ process less dysfunctional, but in the realm of ‘strategic culture’ the intergovernmental method is the only relevant one.

In short, the ‘actorness’ of the EU is being built from the bottom up in various ways that do not involve sensitive questions about national sovereignty: the EU has the EDA; it has proposed permanent structured cooperation; it has developed much crisis-management capacity in both the Commission and the Council Secretariat; it is developing the battle groups, etc. However, this does not add up to ‘actorness’, and even less to a strategic culture. We should therefore treat the question of whether the EU is a strategic actor with a strategic culture in a manner distinct from the incremental capacity-building process. There is no logical connection between the two, although a strategic actor cannot act without capacities.

Regarding the military capability to act, there is a constant and relevant buildup of EU forces, both in terms of rapid reaction (battle groups), follow-on forces, etc, as well as in terms of the civilian–military interface, as discussed briefly in the introductory part of this article. The EU has shown that it is possible to build more than ‘paper tigers’. The problem with regard to strategic culture is not primarily military capacity, but political will.
EU Strategic Culture: A Contradiction in Terms?

By strategic actor, we mean both the ability to threaten the use of force through coercive diplomacy and the ability to actually deploy such force (Hyde-Price, 2004; Johnston, 1995). Both aspects of strategic action demand political will and ability, as well as military capability.

The classics, from Clausewitz to Brodie, were concerned with war as an instrument of policy, war as a political tool. The clue to an EU strategic culture is to understand that ‘war’ in this context will mean the military tool integrated with other tools. The ongoing work on civil–military integration, the stress on crisis management and a ‘European way of war’ (Everts et al., 2005) point in the direction of a carefully framed use of force. The Kosovo experience showed how strong the political constraints on using military force are, both inside the military mission – where much more force could have been used with a quick result – and from the outside, from the constant interaction in the ‘iron triangle of public opinion’ between publics, press and politicians.

Coercive diplomacy gives strength and conviction to the other instruments of statecraft, and is of course far preferable to actually using force. The averting of war is often the result of effective coercive diplomacy, hence the paradox that effective coercive diplomacy enhances peace by preventing conflict. Former Swedish prime minister Carl Bildt has remarked that it was the tragedy of the EU that it was unable to use coercive diplomacy in the case of Slobodan Milosevic. We now know this diagnosis to be correct. If Europe is to be effective as a foreign policy actor beyond the states that may aspire to membership (and which are therefore coerced by economic and political tools in a very effective way already), its politicians must be able to employ coercive diplomacy, as has been pointed out by, among others, Robert Cooper (2003).

Thus, an apparent paradox arises: The EU can be expected to be able to deploy force with more and more capability and legitimacy, but it cannot be expected to threaten the use of force effectively. The Achilles heel of coercive diplomacy in the EU lies in the Union’s need for multilateral legitimacy in using force, as well as in its need to achieve unitary actor status before a threat can be launched. In current debates among policymakers and academics, there is considerable disagreement over whether the EU is able to develop a strategic culture (Toje, 2005; Naumann, 2005; Heusgen, 2005; Lantis, 2005). Solana himself calls for ‘the need to develop a strategic culture that fosters rapid and when necessary robust intervention’ (quoted in Toje, 2005: 11, my emphasis).

However, as we have seen, EU decisionmaking on deployment (and therefore also on coercive diplomacy that threatens the use of force) is based on
unanimity. The states that participate in this have widely different strategic cultures: from France and the UK, which are used to global military activism, to Germany, which needs a UN mandate and parliamentary approval for any use of force, even when such use is intended for peacekeeping purposes (Wagner, 2005; Ministry of Defence, 2001). The decisionmaking for the launching of existing EU missions has taken up to several years. The difficulty of developing a strategic culture, given such constraints, is obvious.

However, there is a new and central interest for all EU states in achieving more of a common EU security policy. This has to do with legitimacy: The use of force is, as stated, increasingly precarious in terms of domestic support, while it both is risky in terms of own losses and demands a post-conflict commitment to year-long state-building. For these and other reasons, such an extensive ‘toolbox’ as that of the EU makes the latter an attractive venue for a common security policy.

The Importance of Legitimacy

Legitimacy is tied both to ethics and to international law – that is, to internationally recognized norms – and less and less to Westphalian state interests. The advent of a right to humanitarian intervention in the 1990s has put the emphasis on human security rather than state security. This development is continuing with the emergence of ‘integrated missions’ in the UN context (Eide et al., 2005), and is evident in the crisis-management policy of the EU and NATO. The EU as a law- and norms-based international actor seems well positioned to achieve legitimacy in this policy field. Thus, the EU may be at an advantage in developing a post-national security and defence policy despite the lack of unitary action capacity.

I now turn to the issue of what kind of strategic culture this will entail in terms of legitimacy. In the Cold War period, strategic thinking concerned how to avoid war, whereas it is now, as in earlier historical periods, about winning wars of a special kind – the PSOs. Although the notion of ‘soft security’ has been developed – that is, a security policy based on interdependence, membership, political conditionality and common values – there has to date been very little European thinking on the military aspects of such a security policy.

As stated, there is a growing, but not very developed, literature on the EU as a ‘different’ foreign policy actor, in the sense of its being a post-national

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3 I do not enter into discussion about the concept of strategic culture here. See Johnston (1995) for a discussion of the analytical problems connected with its use, and Neumann & Heikka (2005) for a useful critique of the concept of ‘culture’ as traditionally used in this literature.
actor: one that does not look like a Westphalian state and one that is not an intergovernmental organization. This ‘governance system’, however, is distinct in its basis in treaty law and international legal norms. The EU is based on and held together by law.

Why is this important for security policy? If legitimacy for using military force matters increasingly in the post-national paradigm, then any actor who deploys such force must heed this fact. The difference between the US National Security Strategy (White House, 2002) and the European Security Strategy is not one of threat assessment or of policy response, but one of difference in terms of what constitutes legitimacy for the use of force.

The two strategic documents largely contain very similar views on threat assessment and the need to deploy force in cases where other tools do not deliver, but there is a clear difference between them on what constitute legitimate criteria for deployment. The ESS demands a multilateral political process before the deployment of force and underlines the importance of a UN mandate as the main rule. The US strategy, as is well known, opens for unilateral pre-emptive and even preventive use of force, as discussed below.

In short, the EU stresses international legal norms; the USA stresses a Westphalian view of security policy (threats to national interests and values) and of legitimacy for using force.

The ESS is now in the process of being ‘fleshed out’ through the development of a concrete security policy and strategic doctrine. In addition, the first commissioned expert report has been published, interestingly entitled ‘A Human Security Strategy for Europe’ (Kaldor et al., 2004). In this expert report, it is advised that the EU develop a security policy based on human rights and not on state sovereignty. The report is bold in its call for what it refers to in its Executive Summary as a ‘new legal framework to govern both the decision to intervene and the operations on the ground’.

Furthermore, the EU plans much more systematic cooperation with the UN than hitherto. This is important, as the ESS stresses the vital importance of international law for intervention. Such cooperation, if successful, would provide an essential operational link between the two key organizations in this field. Only the EU commands a ‘toolbox’ as varied as that of the UN, and the UN itself must rely on regional organizations for the implementation of all mandates.

The EU defines itself as an international actor according to the Copenhagen Criteria: it is based on democracy, the rule of law, human rights and market economy principles. Both membership and cooperation with third countries are premised on this. Whereas a traditional state is based on the concept of a specific nation with a common history and ‘national interests’ – notably, not ‘state interests’ – the EU is defined in terms of its underlying values, cast as the Copenhagen Criteria. This is an important point with regard to security policy: if the ‘new’ security policy is one based on these values rather than
on territorial interests and state-to-state conflicts, then the EU is logically at
the forefront of this development.4

The ESS as a Strategic Document

The threat picture developed in the ESS is similar to that of the US National
Security Strategy, but differs from the latter regarding the view of legitimacy
for the use of force:

The response to this security challenge is to ‘build an international order
based on effective multilateralism’ – a term also used by Washington. In the
EU context, it has another definition: this order has to be ‘rule-based’, as ‘we
are committed to upholding and developing international law. . . . The fundamental
framework for international relations is the UN Charter. The UNSC
has the primary responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and
security. Strengthening the UN, equipping it to fulfil its responsibilities and
to act effectively, is a European priority’ (European Union, 2003: 9).

The ESS does not explicitly discuss the importance of the UN mandate, nor
does it require such a mandate in order for military force to be deployed. A
reasonable interpretation is that a mandate is not a requirement but is
highly desirable, and that the political process around intervention can and
should take place in the UNSC; also, that international law and its inter-
pretation should take place in the same context, and international law should
be understood as the UN Charter in this field.

How will the EU react to the development of humanitarian and democratic
intervention? This is where the ‘human security’ thinking enters with rele-
vance. The human rights and democracy basis of the EU as an actor would
seem to require also a security policy based on these values, logically speak-
ing. If human rights are gradually mainstreamed into all EU foreign policy,
what about security and defence?

Human Security

‘Human security’ refers to an emerging security agenda in which the point
of reference is the individual person and his or her right to personal security.

4 Studies of the EU's actual human rights-based foreign policy, however, show that the application of these
criteria is far from consistent – it is less costly to criticize Zimbabwe than to attack China on the issue of
human rights. Nonetheless, the very basis of the EU is a set of treaties, possibly soon a constitution.
Research on the EU as a 'post-national actor' is a major ongoing concern, where key concepts are non-
territoriality and new types of interests tied to both normative and material power.
This is a human right enshrined in all relevant human rights documents. In the scholarly debate, ‘human security’ has been criticized as being imprecise and far too broad (King & Murray, 2001; Burgess & Owen, 2004). In the extensive debate in *Security Dialogue* (Burgess & Owen, 2004), the term is defined in a number of ways. This is more important to practitioners in policy fields such as development than to academics, because the former need to operationalize the concept for budgets and policies. However, for academics the danger is that the term becomes as loose as was the ‘extended’ security concept of the early 1990s.

In this article, I simply use ‘human security’ as a contrast to ‘state security’, which has dominated security policy for centuries. If security policy now becomes increasingly based on the individual right to personal security, which is a human right, this is nothing less than a paradigm shift. How this will be delineated in operational policy terms is left out of this analysis, which is purely interested in the normative basis for security policy.

The main contributions to the human security model have come from the report of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS, 2001), as well as the 2004 Barcelona Report (Kaldor et al., 2004) to High Representative of the Common Foreign and Security Policy Javier Solana.

The ICISS report goes fairly far in indicating that there exists an international responsibility to protect when a state fails to protect its own citizens. Adopting the definition of sovereignty that is conditional upon the respect for human rights, the report states that ‘sovereignty is more than just a functional principle of international relations. . . . The conditions under which sovereignty is exercised – and intervention is practised – have changed dramatically since 1945. . . . It is acknowledged that sovereignty implies a dual responsibility . . . internally to respect the dignity and basic rights of all the people within the state. In international human rights covenants, in UN practise, and in state practise itself, sovereignty is now understood as embracing this’ (ICISS, 2001: 8). On the basis of a delineation of the implications of this, the Commission proposes that ‘where a population is suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression or state failure, and the state in question is unable or unwilling to halt or avert it, the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect’ (ICISS, 2001: xi).

The so-called Barcelona Report on the ESS and human security, commissioned by Javier Solana and presented in late 2004, represents the first coherent attempt to develop a policy for intervention based on the human security concept, not only in terms of policy and legal principles – as in the ICISS report – but also in terms of the needs of civilian–military integration. The study suggests that the ESS should be based on seven principles: ‘the primacy of human rights, clear political authority, multilateralism, a bottom-up
approach, regional focus, the use of legal instruments, and the appropriate use of force’ (Kaldor et al., 2004: Executive Summary; my emphasis).

The authors make a central important point about the link between legitimacy and the use of inadequate types of force: ‘Human rights have become much more prominent, and an intervention that uses traditional warfighting means, such as bombardment from the air, may be unacceptable when viewed through the lens of human rights’ (Kaldor et al., 2004: 9). Interventions will increasingly be judged not only in terms of military and other results, but also in terms of military methods, also beyond the existing regulations on weapons and their use.

The authors make their case for a ‘human security’ basis for EU security policy on three grounds: human rights are becoming ever more prominent in international politics; public pressure has been behind all the humanitarian interventions of the 1990s; and the EU is legally bound to promote human rights worldwide, as stated in UN instruments and as specifically noted in Article 4 of the new Constitutional Treaty, where it is declared that ‘in its relations with the wider world, the Union shall uphold and promote its values and interests . . . (in) strict observance and development of international law’.

The authors further note that the intention of all EU operations is to ‘uphold human rights and to act in support of law and order’ (Kaldor et al., 2004: 2). Thus, the goal of such use of force is the promotion of the basis values discussed above. The realist will look in vain to find a strategic rationale for much of what goes on in these interventions.

On the use of force, the Barcelona Report goes far in the direction of replacing existing rules on state actors with human rights-based rules: ‘Unlike in classic wars where only states bore responsibility, armed forces have to act within a legal framework that applies to individuals’ (Kaldor et al., 2004: 19).

The human security basis of using force was further developed and given a political boost by the UN Reform Panel’s report A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility (United Nations, 2004), which in turn formed the basis for Kofi Annan’s proposals for reforming the UN, debated by the General Assembly in autumn 2005. Here, the ‘responsibility to protect’ becomes a key principle that should be regarded as a duty by the UN. With regard to failed states, such places are often characterized by humanitarian disaster and are also easy hiding places for terrorists. In short, the Reform Panel and the UN Secretary-General are very clear and precise on the need to intervene with robust military capacity in failed states, but on the basis of a human security reasoning. In the policy discussion arising from the UN experience, the importance of civil–military integration is now a key issue, based on the

5 The report explicitly states that missions that are not robustly equipped will invite spoilers (United Nations, 2004: 61).
lessons learned’ from PSOs in the 1990s.6 The issue of ‘integrated missions’ is on the top of the agenda in the UN,7 the EU and NATO.

This marks the political conclusion to the ten-year-long development of the concept of human security. It also makes the EU a potentially more relevant security actor by changing the very logic of the nation-state’s security interests, which are no longer ‘national’ and ‘territorial’.

Capability, Legitimacy, but No Political Will?

I have argued that there is no major constraint on EU actorness, neither in military nor in political terms, when we speak about deployment in PSOs that do not involve high-intensity warfare. Once a political decision is reached to deploy, there are military resources in Europe for most relevant purposes.8 The bottleneck is not procedural rules in the EU, but rather political will. The EU’s lack of a developed strategic culture has been noted as a drawback in this regard: this culture is embryonic and in the process of development.

Notwithstanding the above, the basis for a post-national security policy is developing for several reasons: absence of existential territorial threat, economic imperatives for military integration, and loosening of the citizen–state social contract in general terms are all factors that make for nothing less than a paradigm shift, also in terms of legitimacy. This prepares the ground for an EU role in the field of security policy. The ‘human security’ basis for the use of force is being developed at the UN in the form of a ‘responsibility to protect’. The EU’s own security strategy adopts the concept and embeds it firmly in international law and the UN system. The concept ‘weds’ human rights to security, including military security.

In this article, I have argued that the EU, being a non-Weberian polity type, is well positioned to develop a strategic culture for the ‘limited wars’ of PSOs. Not only does the EU’s own value basis in the Copenhagen Criteria fit with its non-national security make-up, but it also possesses all the necessary tools in the PSO toolbox.

Thus, the argument is that the EU has the capacity, both military and political, to deploy force in PSOs. It also has the ‘human security’ basis for so doing, and the argument is here two-fold: first, human security replaces state security in post-national wars; second, the normative changes towards such

6 See, for example, the extremely detailed analysis of all major UN operations after the Cold War in Weiss (2005).
7 The UN commissioned Espen B. Eide and others to carry out an in-depth study of current African PSOs in this regard; see Eide et al. (2005).
8 I am grateful for valuable comments on this point from General Sverre Diesen in connection with an earlier draft of this article.
a basis are evident, especially in the recent UN process. Furthermore, the need for stable support – legitimacy – for the use of force once deployed is a reason why governments may want to strengthen the EU’s role in security policy.

However, potential legitimacy does not equal actual legitimacy. Tony Blair’s ‘force for good’ can easily backfire, as it did in his own re-election campaign. There is no reason to believe that the EU’s necessary conditions for strategic culture will translate into military activism. There are inherent contradictions in the ‘soft power model of hard power’ – only cases of clear, persistent and well-publicized breaches of human rights are candidates for PSOs. As Beck (2005: 15) points out, ‘intervention, like non-intervention, produces resistance and de-legitimation’. The risk involved in using military force is high and, when the threat is non-existent, hard to legitimize to one’s own nationals, some of whom risk their lives. The EU lacks a traditional strategic culture, as we have shown above, that is not risk-averse to using force precisely because the threats are presented as existential. These facts may make the EU use of force seldom and sparse in PSOs and, as argued, non-existent in coercive diplomacy.

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